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1. Introduction 
 
One of the trends common in higher education around the world is its mass 
character. More and more freshmen with different social, economic and 
academic backgrounds enter universities every year. In turn, universities are 
increasingly competing with each other for the most talented students. Which 
universities attract the strongest student body? Which faculties attract the 
weakest students? To which extent has the system of higher education become 
non-homogeneous? And finally, how do universities differ in the quality and 
heterogeneity of their admissions? In this paper, we develop a methodology 
that helps us answer these questions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
A survey of relevant literature reveals no special studies on the issue of 
system’s heterogeneity in higher education. However, heterogeneity has been 
rather extensively studied as a phenomenon in the sphere of education. At 
least three possible viewpoints on the problem of heterogeneity can be derived 
from the existing studies: diversification of higher education institutions, 
selectivity of higher education institutions, and heterogeneity of the student 
population. 
Institutional diversification of higher education institutions is considered as 
a response to the diversity of needs and requirements of society as a whole 
[Reichert, 2009]. The proponents of this view believe that the traditional 
institutions of higher education, such as classic universities, are no longer 
useful to meet the demands and interests of an increasingly heterogeneous 
student population, or to meet the requirements of a rapidly changing economy 
[Guri-Rosenblit, Sebkova, 2006]. Accordingly, the diversification of the 
educational system is the natural result of higher education becoming truly 
massified [Schofer, Meyer, 2005].  
Critics of educational diversification argue that it does not satisfy the 
requirements of the entire heterogeneous population, especially of low-income 
students [Posselt et al., 2012]. The explanation is that diversity in higher 
education can turn into a polarized system with the competitive institutions on 
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one end, and the rest of the institutions with low educational standards on the 
other end. So, while providing access to higher education for various groups of 
students, diversification of higher education possibly creates an additional 
hierarchy amongst institutions. This hierarchy is based on the prestige of 
different universities, and as a result it preserves an inequality that already 
exists in society today [Carnevale, Strohl, 2010]. 
The other phenomenon that reflects the heterogeneity problem is the 
selectivity of higher education institutions. Selectivity can be defined as a set 
of requirements aimed to separate entrants who can study at the university 
from those who cannot. In some countries educational systems can be 
characterized by the low selectivity of universities, for example, in France 
(except of Grandes Écoles). But despite the low entrance standards and quite 
heterogeneous set of students, selection of talented students and attrition of 
incapable students occurs, mainly during the learning process [Calmand et al., 
2009]. If the university adheres to a rigid selection system, it will select the 
best candidates with the highest scores and the deepest academic backgrounds. 
At the same time, the strict selectivity and the prestige of some universities 
influences graduates’ future opportunities, including income and professional 
status [Brewer et al., 1999; Datcher, Garman, 2005].  
Nowadays, in some countries (e.g., in the USA) universities and colleges 
have to follow some requirements in order to contribute to the diversity of the 
student body. So, even prestigious colleges regularly use racial or legacy 
preferences, as well as preferences for talented athletes, in selecting their 
students [Pastine, Pastine, 2012]. Though high test scores are the most 
significant precondition for enrolment in the most selective universities, they 
do not guarantee a place in those institutions, and even the contingent of 
highly selective institutions can often appear academically non-uniform 
[Hurwitz, 2011]. 
Another possible viewpoint on the problem of heterogeneity is to consider 
the heterogeneity of the student body in terms of differences in the 
characteristics of students.  
A number of studies have demonstrated that differences in family 
background have some effects on students’ university choice and their 
educational achievements [McEwan, 2003; Woessmann, 2004; Brian, 2010]. 
Additionally, differences in peer socioeconomic status (SES) and their impact 
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on student learning have been widely discussed [Evans et al., 1992; Robertson, 
Symons, 2003; van Ewijk, 2010]. A range of studies consider ethnicity and 
race as another possible source of heterogeneity, influencing student academic 
achievements [Baker et al., 2000; Braswell et al., 2001; Altschul et al., 2006].  
Difference in academic ability is also a factor, setting students apart and 
affecting their performance. A number of researchers consider academic 
heterogeneity in terms of so-called peer-effects. They measure the effect that 
the average performance of one group of students has on another group of 
students [Sackerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2004; De Paola, Scoppa, 2010; 
Andrushak et al., 2012; Bielinska-Kwapisz, Brown, 2012]. Yet another 
important issue is how to estimate the impact of homogenous or 
heterogeneous group formation on students results [Lyle, 2008, Huang, 2009]. 
In all the studies discussed above, econometric tools are used. In particular 
different regression models (multiple, logistic, multilevel or quintile 
regression, etc.) try to estimate between students’ heterogeneity and academic 
achievements. These models do not measure heterogeneity itself; researchers 
simply accept this phenomenon as a given. In order to measure the 
heterogeneity, they mainly refer to standard deviation, range or interquartile 
range, as well as the variance. 
There have also been attempts to consider the problem of heterogeneity of 
the educational system on the country-level [Murdoch, 2002]. Using data from 
the CHEERS project (Careers after Higher Education: a European Research 
Survey) Murdoch assesses heterogeneity in selectivity between higher 
education institutions for each educational field within a set of countries (some 
European countries and Japan). To do so he takes the entry grade given by 
each graduate (on the scale of “high” (1), “medium” (2), and “low” (3)), then 
computes the mean for all the institutions and departments, and then finds the 
variance. Countries with a low variance are seen as homogeneous in terms of 
student selection across the different institutions, while countries with a high 
variance seem to be more heterogeneous in selectivity.  
These studies do not consider heterogeneity in terms of the system as a 
whole. If analysis is performed on small samples (for example, within one 
student group), an interesting measure of heterogeneity is the Goodness of 
Heterogeneity Index [Graf, Bekele, 2006]. For each particular student a score 
is computed as the sum of all values of the student attributes (including 
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interest in the subject, achievement motivation, level of performance in the 
subject, and others). The range of the index lies between 0 and a value that 
depends on the difference between the maximum and minimum sum of scores. 
The Goodness of Heterogeneity Index is equal to 0 if all students in a group 
have equal scores. A value less than 1 means unreasonable heterogeneity, i.e. 
student scores are at two extremes. And a value more than 1 indicates a 
reasonable level of heterogeneity. Under “reasonable level” authors suppose a 
combination of low, average and high student-scores. We doubt that this index 
can be used to evaluate heterogeneity in the problem under study.  
In Fedriani and Moyano [2011] multidigraphs are used to evaluate the 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of schools. Authors develop the concept of 
heterogeneity in terms of the degree of hierarchy in these multidigraphs. 
Unfortunately, this approach cannot be used to analyze the system’s 
heterogeneity, since the hierarchical structure is inherent to any system of 
education in the world. 
It should be noted that some other tools from different fields of science 
could possibly be transferred to educational systems in order to measure their 
heterogeneity. For instance, in economics, attempts to formalize a systemic 
heterogeneity are mainly concerned to the evaluation of income inequality by 
the well-known Gini coefficient [Sudhir, Segal, 2008; Bosi, Seegmuller, 2006] 
or similar indices [Becker et al., 2005]. However, the use of Gini coefficient 
for our problem does not prove particularly useful, as the form of the 
corresponding Lorenz curve turns out to be linear.  
In summary, while there are different approaches to consider and measure 
the problem of heterogeneity, almost all of them have some limitations and 
cannot be used to properly evaluate the heterogeneity of the educational 
system as a whole. Thus, we are introducing a new concept of estimating 
heterogeneity.  
To do this we propose a mathematical model based on the construction of 
universities’ interval order. Then we use the Unified State Examination (USE) 
scores of Russian students to illustrate how our measure of the system’s 
heterogeneity works. 
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3. The model 
 
3.1. The construction of interval order 
 
Denote the set of all universities as . For each university  
it is known the set of entrance grades , where  is the number of 
students in the university i. 
First, we construct an interval order on the set A of the universities under 
study. Assume that each university is defined by some interval  
depending on the values of the entrance exam grade. How these intervals are 
defined is shown below.  
The interval order on A is constructed as 
iPj  ai > bj	  	   	   	   	   (1)
 
In other words, if the left boundary for i lies at the right of the right 
boundary of j, then we include the pair (i,j) to the interval order.1 
Let us consider an example how the interval order can be constructed for 5 
universities , and let the intervals for these universities be given 
as on Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Intervals for 5 universities 
 
The graph of the corresponding interval order constructed on  with 
respect to the formula (1) is presented on Fig. 2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The notion of an interval order was introduced by Norbert Wiener [Wiener, 1914] (see also 
[Aleskerov et al., 1984], [Aleskerov et al., 2007]).	  
{ }nA ,...,1= Ai∈
{ }iki ivv ,...,1 ik
[ ]ii ba ,
{ }51,..., xxA =
A
	  
	  
10	  
	  
	  
Figure 2. Graph of the interval order for the universities from Fig.1  
 
The matrix (the incidence matrix) corresponding to this interval order is 
shown below. The matrix is constructed as follows: Pij=1 if (i,j)∈ !, otherwise 
Pij=0. 
 
 
                    x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Pid =
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
!
"
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
&
&
&
&
&
 
 
To construct interval order for real universities several methods can be 
used because the intervals themselves can be constructed using different 
concepts.  
For example, for the university  we can construct the interval [ai, bi]  where
 is the minimal entrance exam grade, 
 
ai = minj ! j
i , j =1,..,ki , and bi  is the 
maximal entrance exam grade,
 
bi = maxj ! j
i , j =1,..,ki , obtained by students of 
this very university. 
The second version of the system of intervals for the university  is 
defined as [µi ! "i , µi +"i ] , where  µi  is the mean value of all entrance exam 
P
ia
Ai∈
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grades for this university I, 
 
µi =
1
ki
! j
i
j
" , and  is the standard deviation of 
the grades, 
 
!i =
1
ki
(" j
i #µi )
2
j
$ .  
Following rather standard and widely used approach from mathematical 
statistics we apply the second method, i.e., the interval is defined as the mean 
value of grades ± standard deviation.  
 
3.2. How to evaluate the heterogeneity of the educational system? 
 
Suppose the interval order P is constructed with respect to (1) using real 
data of the universities. Assume also that somehow the notion of ideal interval 
order Pid is defined, which represents our vision on how the grades (students) 
are to be distributed among universities. 
Then as the measure of heterogeneity the Hamming distance is used. This 
distance between two interval orders  B1  and  B2  is defined as  
 
H (B1,B2 )=
1
n(n!1)
bij
1 !bij
2
i , j
" ,                            (2) 
where 
 
bij
1  is equal to 1 if the pair 
 
i , j( )  belongs to the interval order  B1 , 
otherwise 
 
bij
1 =0; 
 
bij
2  is equal to 1 if the pair 
 
i , j( )  belongs to the interval order 
 B2 , otherwise it is equal to 0. 
As an example let us consider again 5 universities shown on Fig. 1. 
Assume that for these universities we construct being based on some model 
the ideal interval order Pid	  shown on Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Graph for the ideal interval order  
iσ
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The corresponding incidence matrix for the ideal interval order is shown 
below 
 
                    x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Pid =
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
!
"
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
$
%
&
&
&
&
&
&
&
&
 
 
Comparing the matrices for the real and the ideal interval orders and using 
(2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval orders as
 H (P,Pid )= 0.1.  
The Hamming distance characterized the deviance of the real system of 
universities from the ideal one: the fewer this distance is the better the real 
system of universities corresponds to our views about what it should be. 
 
3.3. How to construct ideal interval orders? 
 
Below we will give several models how to construct ideal interval orders. 
Certainly they are not ideal in some mathematical sense, rather they 
correspond to our view what the ideal system is. The set of ideal universities 
can be constructed based on the different concepts that will be considered 
below.  
We distinguish three main types of ideal systems: in the first two types we 
are oriented to some extent to the real data, while in the third type we 
introduce the concept of the desired system. This concept is based on our 
assumptions what the system of universities within specific areas of training 
should look like. 
 
3.3.1. Clustered system 
First, we suggest to construct an ideal interval order using some clustering 
of the universities based on their means of USE grades. So, we consider the 
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mean value of grades for each university and cluster these values by k-means 
method for a given number of clusters. Different number of clusters can be 
used. We consider 3, 4 and 5 clusters. But only the 4 clusters case can be well 
interpreted for our case. Then for each university we define its ideal 
counterpart having the mean value mI as in the center of the cluster, and the 
interval for such ideal university is given as  [m
I ! "I ,mI +"I ] , where  !
I is 
the standard deviation for the corresponding cluster. Thus, each cluster 
contains several universities (equal to the number of universities placed in the 
cluster) with the same intervals. 
Then we construct the interval order  using the rule (1). 
Let us consider a simple example of the real system of 4 universities with 
the parameters presented in the Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Parameters of universities analyzed 
 
The incidence matrix for the interval order for ‘real’ data is given in the 
Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Incidence matrix for “real” data 
 
 A B C D 
A 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 
C 1 1 0 0 
D 1 1 1 0 
 
Let us construct Pl. For simplicity assume that there are only 2 clusters. 
One cluster contains A and B, and the other consists of C and D. The center of 
IP
University Mean USE score 
µi 
Standard deviation σi Respective intervals 
µI – σi
 
µI + σi
 
A 60 5 55 65 
B 65 5 60 70 
C 80 3 77 83 
D 90 5 85 95 
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the first cluster is 62.5 with standard deviation of 3.54. The center of the 
second cluster is 85 with standard deviation of 7.07. 
The intervals for this case and the incidence matrix for the interval order 
for clustered data are presented in the Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3. Intervals for clustered data 
 
Ideal points by 
clustering 
Ideal point left Ideal point right 
iA 58.96 66.04 
iB 58.96 66.04 
iC 77.93 92.07 
iD 77.93 92.07 
 
Table 4. The incidence matrix for the interval order for clustered data  
 
 
iA iB iC iD 
iA 0 0 0 0 
iB 0 0 0 0 
iC 1 1 0 0 
iD 1 1 0 0 
 
Using formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between real 
interval order and PI in this case. It is equal to 0.08.  
 
3.3.2. Uniform system 
The second method of constructing the ideal interval order deals with the 
centers of groups uniformly distributed over the set of universities. We divide 
into k intervals of equal length the interval from the minimal value m of real 
entrance grades, 
 
m = min
i
mi , to the maximal value M of these grades, 
 
M = max
i
M i . Then we construct k centers ci of these intervals (they will be on 
the equal distances from each other), and divide all universities into k groups 
in accordance with the mean USE grades. The interval itself for each ideal 
group of universities is constructed as  [ci !0.001,ci +0.001] . Note that these 
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tiny intervals around such points are defined only to treat the data as an 
interval order and to avoid unnecessary complications with computer precision 
issues. Then we construct an interval order PII on the set of these ideal groups 
of universities using the rule (1). 
As for a number k of ideal groups of universities, after preliminary analysis 
our suggestion is to use k = 4. This number of groups can be easily interpreted: 
the group of very strong, elite universities admitting only high ability students 
and opposite, the group of weak universities with mainly low ability students; 
between these two polar groups there are two middle groups of universities. 
The difference between these middle groups is in ability level of students: 
students of one group are below the average, while students of another group 
are above the average. 
Let us consider the example from the previous Section. Using the scores of 
Table 2 we construct four intervals [60.0,67.5), [67.5,75), [75,82.5), [82.5,90], 
to which the interval [60,90] is divided. So, the centers of these intervals are 
63.75, 71.25, 78.75 and 86.25. Then the intervals for the ideal system are 
defined as [63.749, 63.751] [71.249, 71.251] [78.749, 78.751], [86.249, 
86.251]. 
The intervals for this case and the incidence matrix for the interval order 
for uniformed data are presented in the Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Table 5. Intervals for uniformed data 
 
University Left bound Right bound 
uA 63.749 63.751 
uB 71.249 71.251 
uC 78.749 78.751 
uD 86.249 86.251 
 
The incidence matrix for the interval order for this uniform system is given 
below. 
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Table 6. The incidence matrix for the interval order for clustered data  
 
University uA uB uC uD 
uA 0 0 0 0 
uB 1 0 0 0 
uC 1 1 0 0 
uD 1 1 1 0 
 
The Hamming distance between real interval order and uniform system is 
equal to 0.08. 
 
3.3.3. A desired system 
The third method of constructing the ideal interval order relates to our 
vision of the system of universities. The description of it will be given further 
separately for different groups of universities based on their majors. The ideal 
interval order PIIIcan be constructed by the same way using the rule (1). 
 
4. Hypothetical systems of universities 
 
What is a system of universities that can be considered “desirable” for 
Russian higher education? What quality of applicants could ensure institutions 
of higher education for different educational needs? These issues became 
especially crucial when considering how the expansion of higher education 
affects all dimensions of society [Forrat, 2009; Belotserkovskii, 2011].  
In this Section we try to construct a hypothetical model for the educational 
system based on an assumption about the stratification of institutions. We 
suppose that the educational system could have several levels of institutions 
based on the quality (and heterogeneity) of students they admit, i.e. from elite 
to ordinary universities. We presume that this structure, for example, best 
answers the current challenges of Russian society and the Russian economy.  
First of all, we assume that the universities taking students with an average 
USE score of about 50 will not likely be able to train specialists prepared for 
the modern economy. Respectively, in our hypothetical system, within each 
integrated group of major there should not be institutions incapable of 
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ensuring a proper quality of education. At the moment these lower-quality 
institutions function as social assistance; for example, they save certain young 
people from the military service or from unemployment. Throughout the last 
decades of mass higher education it has been considered an unwritten norm 
that in every region there is a university which “simply gives higher 
education” [Avanesov, 2013].  
For our “hypothetical” systems, we would like to see universities of two 
main categories. Firstly, it could be a group of strong institutions that accept 
students with a very high USE. These institutions could, for example, focus on 
training high-class professionals with strategic vision, the future leaders of 
both secondary and tertiary level. These universities need to be engaged in 
scientific research and to provide breakthroughs in technologies of education. 
Secondly, it could also be a group of universities that provide mass, but high-
quality, training of specialists, while taking into account regional specifics of 
the labor market. These may not necessarily be research universities. Yet these 
institutions can be focused on providing applicable competencies for their 
graduates.2 
Let us consider in detail the hypothetical educational systems for technical, 
economic, medical and agricultural majors. 
 
4.1. Hypothetical system of higher education institutions  
offering technical majors 
 
Originally, training in technical and engineering fields implies a certain 
level of preparation, mastery of a complex program including higher 
mathematics. It requires high scores on USE mathematics, which, in turn, 
becomes a threshold for applicants. In addition, the graduates of technical 
specialties have serious professional responsibilities, including public 
functions such as the prevention of potential man-made disasters. Therefore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In the European educational space the University of applied character, having only 
undergraduate programs may take high positions in the ranking. For example, Avans University 
of Applied Sciences (Netherlands) has been proclaimed the best major university of applied 
sciences in the national ranking at the end of 2012. <http://www.avans.nl/international/for-
international-organisations/news/detail/2012/12/avans-once-again-the-best-in-the-netherlands>	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for our model the lower bound of USE in the technical majors is set at the 
level of 60 points.3  
A large segment of the universities (the universities of the second tier) 
should recruit students with scores in a relatively small corridor, from 60 to 
70. This allows us to assume that the quality of education will be ensured not 
only by the quality of applicants at the entrance, but also due to the relatively 
small heterogeneity. 
In this hypothetical system the first tier universities could also be a 
relatively small group, no more than 15–20 universities. The number of 
universities providing training within their group of majors is determined by 
the specific industry sectors, each of which needs 1–3 flagship universities. 
The group of first tier universities has to be focused on the preparation of 
high-level engineers. In our proposal, the first tier universities need students 
with average exam scores not lower than 70.4  
Thus, in the group of technical majors we see a hypothetical situation that 
can schematically be presented as follows:  
1) Group of leaders, no more than 10 universities, USE score of the 
admitted students should not be lower than 65–70 in the different majors. 
2) Other higher education institutions (USE score of the admitted students 
should not be lower than 60). 
 
4.2. Hypothetical system of higher education institutions offering  
economic majors 
 
It has become commonplace to talk about an excess of economists and 
managers whom Russian universities send to the labor market, and who do not 
find work in their specialty. However, the labor market’s demand for qualified 
specialists in economic, financial and managerial spheres is far from being 
satisfied. This apparent paradox signals a gap between the quality of training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 According to 2012 data within the integrated group of majors “Electronic Equipment, 
Radio Engineering and Communication” in general 64 higher education institutions took students 
with an average USE score below this level (authors’ calculations).	  
4 Our assumptions are not much far away from reality.  For example, in the integrated group 
of majors “Electronic Engineering, Radio Engineering and Communications” there were only 5 
such institutions according to our calculations based on the 2012 Monitoring data (see Section 5). 	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for this group of majors and the real expectations of employers regarding this 
quality. It follows that a significant optimization of the training system within 
Economics and Management is required. Currently the situation is as follows: 
almost 80% of universities, including technical and other non-core institutions, 
educate economists and managers. Even medical universities deem it 
necessary to have faculties of Economics and Management. As a result, the 
acceptance threshold for economic programs is not always high, nor is the 
quality of students’ training [Egorshin et al., 2007].  
Therefore, the hypothetical system for economic training can include, from 
our point of view, three main sectors. First of all, we would allocate about 
10% of the institutions to teach professional economists-analysts, with 
developed competences in strategic planning and management. These 
universities should take a contingent of standout students with an average USE 
score not lower than 75. These could be higher education institutions which 
prepare high-class analysts to work in federal and global labor markets.  
At the other end of the system we can assume that about 20% of the 
institutions will prepare good and strong applied specialists, combining 
practical skills (of the former graduates of the secondary vocational education) 
with more developed competences, including goal-setting, professional 
responsibility, open-mindedness, and with fundamental training in basic 
disciplines. Applied baccalaureate programs can offer such results, closing the 
niche of the secondary vocational education, which has been eroded by the 
accessibility of mass higher education. The individual average score of 
Unified State Examination of the students accepted to the economic programs 
in these universities should not be lower than 60. 
Finally, between these two poles, sits the largest group of higher education 
institutions  – about 70% of all universities within the system. These 
universities have to be focused on preparation of specialists for regional labor 
markets, for various sectors of the economy, and for industry. Accordingly, 
students who come to these universities are also located between the two poles 
mentioned above. Their average level of training, expressed in USE mean 
score, is expected to be in the range from 65 to 74. 
Thus, the hypothetical system of higher education institutions conducting 
preparation of economists can be presented as follows: 
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1) A group of elite universities that train managers, strategists, high-class 
analysts (about 10% of universities). Scores of admitted students should not 
fall below 75. 
2) A group of strong universities that train strong professionals for regional labor 
markets (about 70% of universities). Scores of admitted students from 65 to 74.  
3) Group of acceptable quality universities preparing bachelors in applied 
programs (about 20% of universities). Scores of admitted students should not 
be lower than 60. 
 
4.3. Hypothetical system of higher education institutions offering  
agrarian majors 
 
Young people in Russia, unfortunately, do not see prospects for 
agricultural education in the current day. Agricultural specialties are no longer 
in demand, even in specialized institutions. Often the choice of entrants, if it is 
not due to family tradition [Filonenko, Lepin, 2013] or pronounced vocation, 
is far from their priority. Students choose agricultural specialties when it is 
impossible to get an education in other, more preferable specialties. This is 
partly due to a decrease in demand for specialists in this field (with the arrival 
of technical progress to agriculture), and the general trend of migration toward 
cities. Thus, it is not possible to provide a high starting level of applicants. 
Yet, it is clear that admission of applicants with USE score below 50 
effectively means a refusal to provide any quality of training.  
Therefore, in this hypothetical system, we see opportunities for a large 
group of universities oriented toward students with scores from 50 to 60. 
These students may well receive an acceptable level of training and become 
experienced agriculture workers needed in the regions.  
Another relatively small group of universities should provide admission to 
students with USE scores not lower than 60. These universities can hardly be 
called leading (though it does not exclude the presence of several universities 
in this group – the flagships with great research potential). But they can be 
focused on training managers, strategic planners, and a small number of 
researchers for the agricultural industry.  
Thus, the hypothetical  situation for a group of agricultural specialties is as 
follows: 
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1) A group of strong universities that prepare agriculture managers at 
various levels (about 10% of universities). USE scores of applicants being at 
least 60.  
2) The remaining universities. USE scores of applicants not lower than 50.  
 
4.4. Hypothetical system of higher education institutions offering  
medical majors 
 
Traditionally, medical education is highly-demanded and well-recognized 
in society (sometimes despite small salaries and severe working conditions in 
this sphere). Medical universities almost never have problems with 
competition among students, and traditionally select the best entrants with 
high average scores. In fact, the hypothetical model for healthcare can be 
structurally close to the existing real situation: we would distinguish three 
groups of universities, and the difference between applicants' input quality 
would be significant among them.5 Groups may differ more by external factors 
than by the quality of applicants. 
First of all, we would have identified a group of universities that are 
concentrated in the lower boundary, with student scores from 65 to 75. We 
assume that these are regional universities. They could deal with those 
students who did not dare to apply for medical specialities at more prestigious 
universities. In terms of the hypothetical system, they could cover the needs of 
the regional labour markets in health personnel. 
At the other extreme we could put a small group of leaders, who have all 
the opportunities and resources for science and technology development both 
in education and in the professional sphere. They can select the best of the 
best. They can provide high quality education, due to a homogeneous and well 
prepared contingent, and the actual quality of the educational process. The 
graduates of such universities are in high demand on the federal labor market. 
And third, there can be a large intermediate group of universities. This 
group is likely to include medical faculties of big multidisciplinary 
universities, unless they are based on older specialized institutions. This may 
also be mostly regional universities, which will provide the highly-qualified 
medical personnel, but for the local, not federal labor market.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The variation is about 5 points in either direction from the student individual average score.	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The hypothetical situation for the group of medical specialties would be as 
follows: 
1) A group of leading universities (about 10% of universities). Students’ 
scores are not lower than 75.  
2) A group of strong universities. Students score is at least 70.  
3) Good universities. Students’ scores are not lower than 65.  
To conclude, we realize that such a stratified structure may have 
implications regarding the perpetuation of societal inequality. Nevertheless, 
we would like to emphasize that this is only a hypothetical vision, a modeled 
situation with two main goals: to show the deviance of the real educational 
system from this model, and to demonstrate how our method works. 
 
5. The data 
 
The empirical data for this research was obtained from the monitoring 
database “Quality of students’ enrollment” which has been carrying out by the 
National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (NRU HSE)6 
and Russian Information Agency (RIA News).  
The database contains mean scores of Unified State Examination (USE) of 
full-time students enrolled in 2011–2013 on the Bachelor Degree Programs, as 
well as the information on the forms of admission (on competition, out of 
competition, on a tuition-based basis or on a state-financed basis, etc.). We use 
the data for 2012.  
We examine the differences in the heterogeneity in the context of 
integrated groups of majors. As a basis for the allocation of such groups the 
official list of majors in higher education is used.7  
This document contains 27 integrated groups of majors (Bachelor 
programs). We examine four of them: Economy and Management (as the most 
popular), Electronic Engineering, Radio Engineering and Communications (as 
an example of Engineering specialties), as well as Agriculture and Fisheries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Website of the Monitoring “Quality of Universities Admissions – 2012”. 
<http://www.hse.ru/ege/second_section2012/>	  
7 Annex 1 to the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation of 
February 17, 2011 No. 201. <http://base.garant.ru/55171451/>	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and Medicine (polar groups of majors, in terms of the quality of students they 
attract). 
All the Monitoring data that we use in this study are open data. The 
database for Monitoring consists, in general, of the average scores of students 
admitted to the 1st year bachelor programs, full-time form of training.8 
Unfortunately, not all universities have posted on their sites full 
information about admission. At a result, in our database, there are a small 
number of missing values. How the missing values are filled in see in 
Appendix 1.  
It should be also noted, that for purposes of this research we do not use the 
whole set of the data we have. In the Table 7 the sets of initial and used data 
are described. Removal from the general sample occurs because of a small 
number of students or big percentage of missing data (for details see criteria 7 
and 8 of Appendix 1).  
 
Table 7. The general characteristics of the data used 
 
Group of Majors Electronic Engineering 
Economy and 
Management 
Agriculture  
and Fishery Healthcare 
Data Initial data 
Used 
data 
Initial 
data 
Used 
data 
Initial 
data 
Used 
data 
Initial 
data 
Used 
data 
Total number of 
universities 109 105 408 379 94 85 77 77 
Total number of 
enrolled students 10199 9759 93576 91336 18477 17889 36686 36686 
	  
Further we present the data of universities sample within each integrated 
group of majors, that have not been deleted from the general sample.  
The main descriptive characteristics of universities in each of our four data 
sets are presented in Appendix 2, while Table 8 provides the generalized 
information of universities and groups of majors under study. It should be 
pointed that Table 8 shows the data corresponding to the criteria 7 and 8 in 
Appendix 1. The agricultural universities are exceptions, where criterion 8 is 
shifted: minimum number of students in this category is 8 (instead of 15). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See <http://www.hse.ru/ege/second_section2012/meth>.	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Table 8. An overview of the data 
 
Group of Majors Electronic Engineering 
Economy and 
Management 
Agriculture and 
Fishery Healthcare 
Total number  
of universities 105 379 85 77 
Total number  
of enrolled students 9759 91336 17889 36686 
Score mean (range) 47,39–76,97 46,32–83,97 39,77–64,45 56,61–89,32 
Standard deviation 
(range) 2,9–17 3,07–17, 23 3,09–13,16 6,38–14,3 
Score median (range) 46,3–80 43,7–93,3 39,7–64,7 55–93 
 
Further, based on the proposed models the heterogeneity of universities 
within each of the selected groups of majors will be investigated.  
 
6. Results and discussion 
 
6.1. Universities within the integrated group of majors “Electronic 
Engineering, Radio Engineering and Communications” 
 
We will consider the heterogeneity of the system of universities that offer 
courses in the integrated group of majors called here “Electronic Engineering”. 
105 universities from this field were studied. We did not divide the students in 
groups of tuition-based and state-financed students because only a small 
amount of tuition-based students study within this group of majors (see 
Fig. А1 in Appendix 2).  
For a real system of universities, an interval order was built where the 
interval for each university with the average USE scores of enrolled students ± 
standard deviation of these scores were calculated. 
Then, according to the description in Sections 3 and 4, three types of ideal 
systems are constructed.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In addition, we have reviewed other systems. For example, ideally abstract situations where 
universities were distributed uniformly with small intervals (with a diameter of not more than 
0.001), and when the universities were located in real points with small intervals (with a diameter 
of not more than 0.001). But the detailed analysis revealed that these systems are less convenient 
for an interpretation and do not fit the available data.	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1) Clustered system (4 clusters, subsection 3.3.1). 
2) Uniform system (4 groups, subsection 3.3.2). 
3) Hypothetical system (subsection 3.3.3).  
When constructing the ideal system using the first method, a clustering of 
universities based on USE scores and using k-means for a given number of 
clusters (4) is made. The results are shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Clustered system (universities within the group of majors “Electronic 
Engineering”) 
 
Cluster ID Mean St. Dev. Count 
4 58.43 0.89 11 
3 60.38 0.46 30 
2 61.73 0.38 45 
1 63.60 0.72 19 
 
Unfortunately, the clustering of the system does not allow us to allocate 
well interpreted clusters of higher education institutions. In general, students 
in this group of majors are rather homogeneous compared to other integrated 
groups. The level of difficulty in the technical specialties initially assumes a 
certain degree of preparation in mathematics and physics, which determines 
the requirements for examinations in these subjects. In summary, this group of 
university freshmen consists mostly of “B” students.  
Then each university is replaced by its ideal counterpart – the center of this 
cluster. For each university the interval is also constructed as the center (mean 
value) of the cluster ± standard deviation for the corresponding cluster, and 
further the interval order based on formula (1) will be defined.  
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders,  H (P,Pid )= 0.35.  
When constructing an ideal system by the second method, we first made a 
partition of all universities in 4 groups. The interval from the minimal value  m 
= 47.39 of entrance grades to the maximal value M = 76.97 of these grades, we 
divided into 4 intervals of equal length. Each university was assigned to one of 
the 4 groups, according to its USE score. Characteristics of the uniform 
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division into 4 classes of the universities system within the integrated group of 
majors Electronic Engineering are presented in the Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Uniform system (universities within the group of majors “Electronic 
Engineering”) 
 
Number Left Right Center Mean St. Dev. Count 
1 47.39 54.78 51.08 51.81 3.31 27 
2 54.78 62.18 58.48 58.16 1.66 47 
3 62.18 69.57 65.87 64.65 1.91 25 
4 69.57 76.97 73.27 72.45 2.23 6 
	  
Further, each institution from the relevant group is replaced with its ideal 
counterpart ci – the center of the interval of the corresponding group. The 
interval itself for each ideal group of universities is constructed as 
 [ci !0.001, ci +0.001] . Then we construct an interval order on the set of these 
ideal groups of universities using the rule (1). 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders,  H (P,Pid )= 0.30.  
Finally, when constructing an ideal system by the third method we start 
from the hypothetical system of universities, admitting students in technical 
specialties, described in subsection 3.3.3, which can be schematically 
represented as follows:  
1) Group of leaders, no more than 10 universities (an average USE score of 
the admitted students should not be lower than 65–70 in the different majors).  
2) Other higher education institutions (an average USE score of the 
admitted students should not be lower than 60). 
 To explore the possibility of approximation to such a system, we have 
divided the entire system of universities into 3 groups – the most powerful, 
elite (scores above 70), the weakest (scores below 55, i.e. “C” students) and 
others (scores are from 55 to 70). Characteristics of the splitting are presented 
in Table 11.  
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Table 11. The 3 groups of universities (universities within the group of majors 
“Electronic Engineering”) 
	  
The scores' interval Mean St. Dev. Count 
>70 72.99 3.40 5 
[55;70] 59.72 3.97 80 
<55 50.89 1.83 20 
	  
We will consider this system as a prototype for the ideal system. Each 
institution of the relevant group we replace by the ideal counterpart – the mean 
value of USE scores for this group. For each group we construct an interval 
order based on the mean value of scores in the group ± standard deviation for 
the corresponding group. 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders:  H (P,Pid )= 0.15.  
Comparing the values of the Hamming distance for all three types of ideal 
systems, we conclude that the latter system which is based on a splitting of all 
universities into 3 groups – elite, weak and others in the best way reflects  
the real situation for the group of majors Electronic Engineering, Radio 
Engineering and Communications.  
However, as noted earlier, the recommended lower limit of the average 
USE scores for technical training areas lies at the level of 60 points. The 
smaller score cannot guarantee a sufficient level of initial preparation for 
learning on engineering programs. And in our system, there is a group of 20 
universities, where the average score of enrolled students is below 55. 
Deleting this group of universities from the analysis gives a very interesting 
result: the Hamming distance between real and ideal interval orders becomes 
 H (P,Pid )= 0.04.  
Thus, if we exclude from the system very weak universities, the remaining 
pool of universities is becoming a well-coordinated system, i.e., our system of 
universities within the group of majors Electronic Engineering, Radio 
Engineering and Communications comes close to the desired system.	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6.2. Universities within the integrated group of majors  
“Economics and Management” 
 
Let us consider the heterogeneity of the system of universities within the 
integrated group of majors “Economics and Management”. In this group 379 
universities are studied, 342 of them conduct the admission of tuition-based 
students.  
For a real system of universities the interval order was built, where the 
interval for each university with an average USE scores of enrolled students ± 
standard deviation of these scores were calculated. Then for each case three 
types of ideal systems were build (similarly to the way it was done for a group 
of technical universities (Section 6.1)): Clustered system, Uniform system and 
Desired system.  
First, we examine all the students entirely and then separately for state-
funded and tuition-based forms of training.  
When constructing the ideal system by the first way the clustering of 379 
universities based on the average USE scores and using k-means for a given 
number of four clusters is made. The results are shown in Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Clustered system (“Economics and Management”, state-funded + 
tuition-based) 
 
Number	   Cluster ID	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   4	   51.49	   2.02	   86	  
2	   3	   57.20	   1.64	   169	  
3	   1	   63.71	   2.41	   92	  
4	   2	   74.20	   4.08	   32	  
 
The clustering of institutions from this system has allowed us to allocate 
various groups of universities accurately. The first group is formed by 
institutions taking weak students, generally mediocre pupils. We have 86 such 
universities, i.e. nearly a quarter. The second group consists of universities, 
taking overall “B” students, but relatively weak ones. This group is the largest, 
it has 169 universities. A quarter of universities (92) form a group, taking 
“B” – students, but quite strong in average. Finally, the last group consists of 
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universities, attracting mainly standouts (both on state-funded, and on fee-
paying form of training). There are 32 such universities.  
In general the contingent coming on the economic departments of 
universities is characterized by the highest degree of heterogeneity (from the 
discussed groups of majors). This is partly due to the difference in scores of 
fee-paying and state-financed students. But to a large extent, this heterogeneity 
may occur due to the huge amount of non-core universities which have 
economic departments and do not always hold the high bar of admission. 
 Then each university is replaced by its ideal counterpart – the center of 
this cluster. For each cluster the interval order is constructed, as the center 
(mean value) of the cluster ± standard deviation for the corresponding cluster. 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders:  H (P,Pid )= 0.31.  
Next, we performed a similar analysis, but separately for state-funded form 
of training and for tuition-based form. Tables 13 and 14 present the results of 
the clustering based on the average score of enrolled students, respectively, for 
the state-financed form (Table 13) and fee-paying forms of education 
(Table 14).  
 
Table 13. Clustered system (“Economics and Management”, state-funded) 
 
Number	   Cluster ID	   Mean	   St.Dev.	   Count	  
1	   4	   57.38	   2.99	   40	  
2	   3	   64.48	   1.69	   117	  
3	   2	   70.52	   1.85	   126	  
4	   1	   79.00	   3.95	   45	  
 
Table 14. Clustered system (“Economics and Management”, tuition-based) 
 
Number	   Cluster ID	   Mean	   St.Dev.	   Count	  
1	   4	   49.85	   1.81	   100	  
2	   1	   54.32	   1.22	   157	  
3	   2	   58.83	   1.91	   74	  
4	   3	   69.16	   3.98	   11	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In general, the state-funded form of training consists of more strong 
students in comparison to tuition-based form. Yet for each form this cluster 
solution looks quite convincing. So, for the state-funded form of training we 
would allocate two groups of higher education institutions attracting very 
strong students (groups 3 and 4 in Table 13). Together, it is almost half of all 
universities within this group of majors. A group of universities that accept 
state-financed students with their average scores close to “C”-students (group 
1 in Table 13) is quite small, about 10% of institutions. For the fee-paying 
form of education the situation is opposite. The absolute majority of higher 
education institutions, 75% of universities, (groups 1 and 2 in Table 14) accept 
very weak students. Only 11 universities (3% of universities having fee-
paying students) are able to attract on paid programs relatively strong students 
(group 4 in Table 14).  
Next, in the same manner as described previously, the Hamming distance 
is evaluated. The result was that for both tuition-based and state-financed 
forms of admission the Hamming distance between two interval orders is 
 H (P,Pid )= 0.31.  Thus, the Hamming distance does not depend on the form of 
admission: despite various cluster solutions for state-financed and fee-paying 
forms, the real system's deviation from the ideal one is the same. Further we 
will consider all set of students entirely, without carrying out division into the 
state-financed and tuition-based forms of education.  
When constructing an ideal system by the second method, we first made a 
partition of all universities in 4 groups. Characteristics of the uniform partition 
of this universities system into four classes are presented in Table 15.  
 
Table 15. Uniform system (“Economics and Management”, state-funded+ 
tuition-based) 
 
Number	   Left	   Right	   Center	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   46.3	   55.7	   51.03	   52.71	   2.42	   128	  
2	   55.7	   65.1	   60.44	   59.34	   2.50	   190	  
3	   65.1	   74.6	   69.85	   68.93	   2.87	   51	  
4	   74.6	   84.0	   79.26	   79.38	   2.82	   10	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We may notice that only 10 institutions take mainly strong students (with 
the average USE score higher than 74.6), while 128 institutions take weak, 
mainly mediocre students (with an average score lower than 55.7).  
Further, each institution from the relevant group is replaced with its “ideal” 
counterpart ci – the center of the interval of the corresponding group. The 
interval itself for each ideal group of universities is constructed as
 [ci !0.001,ci +0.001] . Then we construct an interval order on the set of these 
ideal groups of universities using the rule (1). 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders:  H (P,Pid )= 0.28.  
Finally, when constructing an ideal system by the third method we start 
from the hypothetical system of universities, admitting students in economic 
specialties, as described in subsection 3.2, which can be schematically 
represented as follows:  
1) A group of elite universities that train managers, strategists, high-class 
analysts (about 10% of universities, the average score of the whole contingent 
of enrolled students should not fall below 75). 
2) A group of strong universities that train strong professionals for regional 
labor markets (about 70% of universities, the average score from 65 to 74).  
3) Group of satisfactory universities preparing bachelors on applied 
programs (about 20% of universities, an average USE score of the admitted 
contingent should not be lower than 60). 
 To explore the possibility of approximation to ideal system, we divide 
the entire system of universities into four groups – the most powerful, elite 
(average score above 75), strong universities (average score from 65 to 75), 
just good institutions (from 55 to 65) and the rest (the average score is below 
55). Characteristics of the splitting are presented in Table 16.  
We will consider this system as a prototype for ideal system. Each 
institution of the relevant group we replace by the “ideal” counterpart – the 
average value of USE scores for this group. For each group, we construct an 
interval order based on the mean value of scores in group ± standard deviation 
for the corresponding group. 
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Table 16. The splitting into 4 groups (universities within the group of majors 
“Economics and Management”) 
 
The scores' interval Mean St. Dev Number of universities 
>75 79.38 2.82 10 (3%) 
(65;75] 68.85 3.29 52 (14%) 
(55;65] 58.76 2.67 220 (58%) 
<=55 51.85 1.26 97 (25%) 
 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders:  H (P,Pid )= 0.26.  
Comparing the values of the Hamming distance for all three types of ideal 
systems, we conclude that the latter system which is based on a splitting of all 
universities into four groups (elite, strong, ordinary and weak universities) in 
the best way reflects the real situation for the group of majors “Economics and 
management”.  
Of course, the number of strong institutions in this group is much smaller 
than we would like – just 17% versus desired 80%. It is therefore necessary to 
improve the quality of admission for all universities in this group of majors. 
However, in Table 16, there is a group of 97 universities, gaining mostly very 
weak students (average USE score below 55). As noted earlier, in this group 
should not be universities taking students with an average score below 60. 
Similarly to the way it was done for a group of technical universities, we will 
“delete” from our system a group of weak universities. Deleting this group of 
universities from the analysis gives a very interesting result: the Hamming 
distance between real and ideal interval orders becomes  H (P,Pid )= 0.16.   
Thus, if we exclude from the system very weak universities, the remaining 
set of universities is becoming a well-structured system, however, still far 
from the desirable one.	  
 
6.3. Universities within the integrated group of majors  
“Agriculture and Fishery” 
 
We will consider the heterogeneity of the system of universities within the 
integrated group of majors “Agriculture and Fishery”. 85 universities from this 
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field were studied. We did not divide the student contingent in 2 groups of fee-
paying and state-financed students. Our decision can be explained by small 
amount of fee-paying students within this group of majors. According to our 
database only 7% of universities have fee-paying admission, and 60% of them 
admit less than 10 students (see Fig. A9 in Appendix 2). 
For a real system of universities the interval order was built, where the 
interval for each university with an average USE scores of enrolled students ± 
standard deviation of these scores were calculated. Then for each case three 
types of ideal systems were built: Clustered system, Uniform system and 
Desired system.  
When we construct the ideal system by the first way, we cluster 
universities based on the average USE scores and use the method of k-means 
for a given number of four clusters. The results are shown in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Clustered system (universities within group of majors 
“Agriculture”) 
 
Number	   Cluster ID	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   3	   43.46	   1.96	   11	  
2	   1	   49.80	   1.51	   40	  
3	   2	   54.31	   1.32	   28	  
4	   4	   60.77	   2.02	   6	  
 
All universities conducting enrollment of students to agriculture programs 
generally attract quite uniform, but the weak contingent of students. There are 
no universities in this group, which attracts in average students-standouts. 
Unfortunately, the students enrolled in agricultural majors for the most part 
cannot cross the border of 55 USE scores. Thus 51 universities (60%) are 
gaining very weak students (groups 1 and 2 in Table 17).  
Then each university from the corresponding cluster is replaced by its ideal 
counterpart – the center of this cluster. For each university also the interval is 
constructed, as the center (mean value) of the cluster ± standard deviation for 
the corresponding cluster. And further the interval order based on formula (1) 
will be defined.  
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Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders:  !(!,  Pid) = 0.31. 
When constructing an ideal system by the second method, we first made a 
partition of all universities into four groups. Characteristics of uniform 
partition of this universities’ system are presented in Table 18.  
 
Table 18. Uniform system (universities within the group of majors 
“Agriculture”) 
 
Number	   Left	   Right	   Center	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   39.8	   45.9	   42.86	   43.20	   1.86	   10	  
2	   45.9	   52.1	   49.03	   49.71	   1.60	   41	  
3	   52.1	   58.3	   55.19	   54.31	   1.32	   28	  
4	   58.3	   64.5	   61.36	   60.77	   2.02	   6	  
 
It is interesting to note that for this group of majors the uniform partition 
practically coincides with the cluster solution, which can be explained by the 
low variation in scores of enrolled students.  
Further, each institution from the relevant group is replaced with its “ideal” 
counterpart ci – the center of the interval of the corresponding group. The 
interval itself for each ideal group of universities is constructed as 
 [ci !0.001,ci +0.001] . Then we construct an interval order on the set of these 
ideal groups of universities using the rule (1). 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders, !(!,  Pid) = 0.31.  
Finally, when constructing an ideal system by the third method we are 
based on the hypothetical system of universities, admitting students on 
agriculture specialties, as described in subsection 3.3, which can be 
schematically represented as follows  
1) A group of strong universities that prepare agriculture managers at 
various levels (about 10% of universities; the average USE score of student 
contingent at least 60).  
2) The remaining universities (an average USE score of students not lower 
than 50).  
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To study the possibility of approximation to such a system, we split the 
entire system of universities into 3 groups – good-quality universities (average 
score above 60), the weakest (average score below 50, i.e. “C” students) and 
others (average score of 50 to 60). Characteristics of the splitting are presented 
in the Table 19.  
 
Table 19. The splitting into 3 groups (universities within the group of majors 
“Agriculture”) 
 
The scores' interval	   Mean	   St. Dev	   Count	  
>60	   61.69	   1.84	   4 (5%)	  
[50;60]	   53.28	   2.2	   49 (58%)	  
<50	   46.82	   2.81	   32 (43%)	  
 
We will consider this system as a prototype for ideal system. Each 
university of the relevant group we replace by its “ideal” counterpart – the 
average value of USE scores for this group. Then for each group we construct 
an interval order as the mean value of scores in the group ± standard deviation 
for the corresponding group. 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders, !(!,  Pid) = 0.25 
Comparing the values of the Hamming distance for all three types of ideal 
systems, we conclude that the latter system which is based on the splitting of 
all universities into 3 groups is the best. It reflects in the best way the real 
situation for the group of majors “Agriculture and Fishery”. 
However, as we have noted earlier, the recommended lower limit of the 
average USE scores for agriculture majors lies at the level of 50 points. The 
smaller score cannot guarantee a sufficient level of initial preparation to 
receive good-quality education. And in our system, there is a group of 32 
universities, where the average score of enrolled students is below 50. 
Deleting this group of universities from the analysis gives a very interesting 
result: the Hamming distance between real and ideal interval orders becomes 
H(!,  Pid) = 0.07. 
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Thus, if we exclude from the system very weak universities, the remaining 
pool of universities turns to a better coordinated system. It is necessary to 
tighten weak students to the minimum acceptable level, at least, not lower than 
50 points. Possibly it could be done through the system of additional 
education. 	  
 
6.4. Universities within the integrated group of majors “Healthcare” 
 
Now we consider the heterogeneity of the system of universities within the 
integrated group of majors “Healthcare”. 77 universities from this field were 
studied. We did not divide the student contingent in two groups of fee-paying 
and state-financed students, because there are not a lot of fee-paying students 
within this group of majors (See Appendix 2, Fig. A13). 
For a real system of universities the interval order was built, where the 
interval for each university with an average USE scores of enrolled students ± 
standard deviation of these scores were calculated. Then for each case three 
types of ideal systems were build (as well as for other groups of majors): 
Clustered system, Uniform system and Desired system.  
Then we cluster universities based on the average USE scores and use the 
method of k-means for a given number of clusters. The results are shown in 
Table 20.  
 
Table 20. Clustered system (universities within group of majors “Healthcare”)  
 
Number	   Cluster ID	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   4	   61.01	   1.99	   13	  
2	   3	   66.18	   1.27	   22	  
3	   2	   71.13	   2.07	   31	  
4	   1	   79.90	   3.65	   11	  
 
Students choosing medical specialties look as very strong and 
homogeneous cohort. So, here we see the division of universities rather on two 
groups and two subgroups in each of them. Essentially universities within this 
field could be divided on “A” students (excellent students) and “B” students 
(good students). At the same time it is possible to allocate in each group the 
subgroups of average performers and universities-leaders.  
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Then each university from the corresponding cluster is replaced by its ideal 
counterpart – the center of this cluster. For each university also the interval is 
constructed, as the center (mean value) of the cluster ± standard deviation for 
the corresponding cluster. And further the interval order based on formula (1) 
will be defined.  
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders, !(!,  Pid) = 0.34.  
When constructing an ideal system by the second method, we first made a 
partition of all universities in four groups. Characteristics of uniform partition 
of this university system are presented in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Uniform system (universities within the integrated group of majors 
“Healthcare”) 
 
Number	   Left	   Right	   Center	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
1	   56.6	   64.8	   60.7	   61.8	   2.3	   17	  
2	   64.8	   73.0	   68.9	   68.8	   2.2	   43	  
3	   73.0	   81.1	   77.1	   76.9	   2.4	   15	  
4	   81.1	   89.3	   85.2	   85.9	   4.8	   2	  
	  
Further, each institution from the relevant group is replaced with its “ideal” 
counterpart ci – the center of the interval of the corresponding group. The 
interval itself for each ideal group of universities is constructed as
 [ci !0.001,ci +0.001] . Then we construct an interval order on the set of these 
ideal groups of universities using the rule (1). 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders !(!,  Pid) = 0.29.  
In the end we construct an ideal system by the third method. We also start 
from the hypothetical system of universities, taking students on medical 
specialties, as described in subsection 3.4. Schematically it could be done as 
follows 
1) A group of leading universities (about 10% of universities, students’ 
score are not lower than 75). 
2) A group of strong universities (students’ score is at least 70).  
3) Simply good universities (students’ scores are not lower then 65).  
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In order to study the possibility to be closer to such a system, we split the 
entire system of universities into four groups – leading, elite institutions 
(average score higher than 75), good-quality universities (average score of 
enrolled students varies from 65 to 75), ordinary universities (average score of 
enrolled students varies from 60 to 65) and others (average score not lower 
than 60). The results of this splitting are presented in Table 22.  
 
Table 22. The splitting into four classes (universities within the integrated 
group of majors “Healthcare”) 
 
The scores' interval	   Mean	   St. Dev.	   Count	  
>=75	   79.16	   3.79	   13	  
(65;75]	   69.41	   2.65	   45	  
[60;65]	   63.24	   1.44	   14	  
<60	   59.03	   1.38	   5	  
	  
We will consider this system as a prototype for ideal system. Each 
university of the relevant group we replace by its “ideal” counterpart – the 
average value of USE scores for this group. Then for each group we construct 
an interval order as the mean value of scores in the group ± standard deviation 
for the corresponding group. 
Comparing the matrices P for real and ideal interval orders and using 
formula (2) we can calculate the Hamming distance between two interval 
orders, !(!,  Pid) = 0.29.  
And again, if we compare the values of the Hamming distance for all three 
types of ideal systems, we can conclude that the latter system which is based 
on a splitting of all universities into 4 groups is the best. It reflects in the best 
way the real situation for the group of majors “Healthcare”. 
But as we have noted earlier, the desirable lower limit of the average USE 
scores for medical majors lies at the quite high level of 60 points. The smaller 
score seems cannot guarantee a sufficient level of initial preparation for 
training the future health workers. The current system of universities has 5 
universities, which admit students with the average score below 60. Deleting 
this group of universities from the analysis gives though less noticeable than in 
other systems, but also an important result: the Hamming distance between 
real and ideal interval orders becomes !(!,  Pid) = 0.26.  
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Thus, if we exclude from the system institutions with weakest students, the 
remaining set of universities becomes well-structured system as in other cases. 
Certainly on the example of integrated group of majors “Healthcare” we do 
not see any essential improvement of the system after excluding weak 
institutions. We can suppose here two possible explanations. Firstly, this is 
because the real and the ideal systems do not have principal differences. And 
secondly, the number of universities which we remove from the system is the 
smallest compared to other groups of majors. 
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
We compared the real and “ideal” systems of universities for all of the 
integrated groups of majors examined in our study. Three types of ideal 
systems were constructed: clustered system, uniform system and hypothetical 
system. Comparing the values of the Hamming distance for all three types of 
ideal systems, we can conclude that the desired system best reflects the data 
analyzed for all integrated groups.  
By comparing distribution of real universities with the desired system, we 
see that the percentage of universities placed, for example, in a group of elite 
universities, differs from the desired situation. This happens because we have 
divided the groups of universities based primarily on the average USE scores 
of the enrolled students, i.e. on the real existing data. Amongst the integrated 
groups, the number of such elite universities proves to be significantly lower 
than the model’s prediction. This is where we need to grow, both for our 
universities and for our students. 
Another delicate issue is the “removal” of higher education institutions. It 
should be noted that when we talk about “removing” universities from the 
system, we do not suggest closing these institutions, though work in this 
direction is being conducted at the state level. Among other things, the 
Monitoring aims to identify ineffective institutions. Moreover, one of the 
criteria of effectiveness is the average score of the students.10 Not everything 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interview with the Rector of the Higher School of Economics Yaroslav Kuz'minov. 
Kommersant, 2013, January 14. <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2101306>	  
	  
	  
40	  
went smoothly with this monitoring in the first years, but this time the criteria 
of efficiency were clarified and their number was increased.11  
In November 2013 the working groups of the Ministry of Education held 
several meetings where the results of the second monitoring of universities 
were discussed. As a result of these meetings about 70–80% of the branches of 
non-state and state universities may be suggested to close.12 Yet there is 
another situation with head universities, placed to the list of inefficient 
institutions. If a university is the only one in a region and plays a crucial role 
in the regional educational system, it will be offered the chance to propose a  
development program. If these measures have no effect, the institution may be 
reorganized.13 
However, we are concerned with the efficiency of universities only 
indirectly. We are interested instead in rather narrow questions: what is the 
heterogeneity that the Russian system of universities work with? What 
happens to the heterogeneity if, theoretically speaking, the weakest element 
would be “eliminated” from the system? 
 Obviously, the preferable situation is if universities would begin to do 
everything possible to attract a student body with a higher level of preparation. 
But this is not always a question that universities themselves can resolve. 
Here, numerous questions emerge regarding the quality of education, the 
influence of teachers, family, etc.  These are the sort of questions that have no 
simple answers.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have proposed a new method of studying heterogeneity in the higher 
education system. Our method is based on the three models of the hypothetical 
educational system, and their comparison to the real systems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The second stage of monitoring schools. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2013, November 18. 
<http://www.rg.ru/2013/11/18/monitoring-site.html>	  
12 Ministry of Education wants to close 80 percent of the universities' branches. Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 2013, December 2. < http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/02/filial-site.html> 	  
13 Three Novosibirsk universities can be reorganized after monitoring of the Ministry of 
Education. RIA Novosti, 2013, November 25. < http://ria.ru/nsk/20131125/979547840.html>	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We applied this method to study four groups of majors of Russian 
universities and obtained interesting results concerning the heterogeneity of 
the system of Russian universities. However, we are dealing with a fairly 
narrow problem. We try to build the assessment of higher education 
institutions on the basis of only one parameter: input grades of university 
students. The next questions follow naturally: how can we extend the basis for 
the evaluation of the heterogeneity of the entire system of higher education? 
Which are the additional parameters to be used in this evaluation? 
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Appendix 
 
1. A procedure of the missed values’ replacement 
	  
The number of missing values in our database is relatively small. Basically 
missing values imply average scores of students enrolled in universities as 
winners of student Olympiads (i.e. without regard to their points of USE). 
Several universities did not provide information about the USE scores of the 
students admitted on the basis of targeted contracts with enterprises and 
regional authorities, or on the basis of benefits. Some universities did not post 
information about the USE scores of tuition-based students enrolled on some 
specialties. 
Percentages of missed values in each of four aggregated groups of majors 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The percentage of missing values 
 
Group  
of majors 
Electronic 
Engineering 
Economy  
and Management 
Agriculture  
and Fishery Healthcare 
Total number 
of missing 
values, % 
3,2 2,5 1,59 0 
 
In an ideal situation, the presence of even such a small number of missing 
values requires additional procedures for their processing. There is a number 
of options to substitute missing values: replacement averages, calculation of 
possible values using the regression models and several others. According to 
[Tabachnick, Fidell, 2001], if the percentage of missing values does not 
exceed 5%, they could be ignored. 
So, in order to solve the problem of incomplete set of characteristics in our 
study we developed a special technique of the missing values replacement 
presented as follows.	  
There are data for k students of n universities. For each student we know 
1) University. 
2) The form of admission (state-funded or tuition-based). 
3) The basis of admission (on competition, out of competition, etc.). 
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4) Unified State Examination (USE) mean score (is not known for all 
students). 
There are gaps in USE scores of a certain number of students. Let us 
describe the procedure of filling these missing values.  
Let us denote the set of all universities as U={u1,u2,…,un}, where ui is i-th 
university, and the set of all students S={s1,s2,…,sk}, where sj is j-th student. 
Each student sj is assigned a vector Z j=(z1j,z2j,z3j,z4j), characterizing each 
student by four features described above. If we do not know USE score of j-th 
student, then z4j = 0. 
Let the set of all USE points be Е={!!!,  !!!,…,  !!!}, where the index i 
corresponds to the i-th university (if the USE score is unknown, it is set to 
equal to 0). The set E is further divided into n subsets Ei (n is the total number 
of universities), where index i correspond to i-th university. Each of the 
subsets Ei is subdivided into two subsets: Eibud – containing estimated exam 
score of students admitted to the state-funded form of training, and Eiсom – 
containing estimated exam score of students admitted to a tuition-based form 
of funding. Zero values of the set Еi are included into the set Eipr (the set of 
score gaps of all students), zero values of set Еibud are included into the set 
Eipr_bud (the set of score gaps of the state-funded students), and zero values of 
the set Еiсom are included into the set Eipr_сom (the set of score gaps of the 
tuition-based students). 
For each university i it is calculated the total number of students ki (where 
i – the index of the i-th university), total number of state-funded students kibud, 
total number of tuition-based students kiсom, total number of students with gaps 
in USE scores kipr, total number of state-funded students with gaps in USE 
scores kipr_bud , and total number of tuition-based students with gaps in USE 
scores kipr_сom 
ki= |Ei|,     (1) 
kibud=|Eibud|,     (2) 
kiсom=|Eiсom|,    (3) 
kipr= |Eipr|,     (4) 
kipr_bud = |Eipr_bud|,   (5) 
kipr_сom= |Eipr_сom|.    (6) 
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Let us introduce some new notations: U’ – the set of the excluded 
universities, S’–the set of the excluded students. For each university ui∈ U the 
conditions (7) and (8) are tested 
ki <15,    (7) 
kipr≥ 0,25 * ki.    (8) 
For Agriculture universities condition (7) is ki<8. With the assumption that 
at least one of the conditions (7) or (8) holds, the university i is included into 
the set U’. All students of the university i are included into the set S’. The USE 
points !!! of the students sj !  S’ are included into the set Е’ (the index j 
corresponds to the j-th student). The number of excluded universities nexcl is 
calculated as nexcl = |Е’ |. 
All the elements of the set U’ are excluded from the set of U, i.e. further 
we will consider the set U*=U\U’. The same procedure is carried out for sets S 
and E, i.e. S*=S\S’, E*=E\E’. Similarly, the procedure is done for the subsets 
of E, E* the set is divided into n – nexcl  subsets Ei*, corresponding to USE 
points of state-funded students of university ui !  U*. Subsets of Ei* are: 
Ei*bud  – containing estimated exam score of students admitted to the state-
funded form of training, and Ei*сom – that of students admitted to a tuition-
based form of funding. For exam scores of students of universities ui  ∈ U* we 
find the maximum and minimum values of the USE on the state-funded 
(maxibud  and minibud) and tuition-based (maxiсom and miniсom) as follows 
 
maxibud = max(Ei*bud),                (9) 
minibud = min(Ei*bud),              (10) 
maxiсom = max(Ei*сom),               (11) 
miniсom=min(Ei*сom).              (12) 
 
Given the number of state-funded and tuition-based students of each 
university, and their USE scores, we calculate average values of USE scores 
for each university for state-funded (еisr_bud) and tuition-based (eisr_сom) forms 
of admission 
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еisr_bud = 
!! !!"#!! !!"_!"# e!! ,! !!"#!!!               (13) 
 еisr_сom = 
!! !с!"!! !!"_с!" e!!! !с!"!!! .             (14) 
 
For each university the 10% range from the maximum values of USE 
scores for the state-funded and for the tuition-based forms is constructed: 
 
maxibud+10 = max(Eibud) + max(Eibud)*0,1,            (15) 
maxiсom+10 = max(Eiсom) + max(Eiсom)*0,1,             (16) 
minibud-10 = max(Eibud) – max(Eibud)*0,1,            (17) 
miniсom-10 = max(Eiсom) – max(Eiсom)*0,1.            (18) 
 
If maxibud+10 > 100, then maxibud+10 = 100. The same holds for maxiсom+10 (if 
maxiсom+10 >100, then maxiсom+10 = 100). 
Next, for each university ui !U* the variance δ2 is computed (separately for 
the state-funded and for the tuition-based) 
 
δ2bud = 
!! !!"#!! !!"_!"# (e!!! !!"#!!!   –   e !!"_!"#),              (19) 
δ2сom = 
!! !с!"!! !!"_с!" (e!!! !с!"!!!   –   e !!"_!"#).             (20) 
 
The intervals for filling the gaps of all students are calculated with the 
exception for those who entered universities by Olympiad competition, 
according to formulas (21) – (24). Formula (21) describes the lower limit of 
the state-funded students (minibud_dis), formula (22) – the upper limit of the 
state-funded students (maxibud_dis), formula (23) – the lower limit of the tuition-
based students (minicom_dis), and (24) describes the upper limit of the tuition-
based students (maxicom_dis) 
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minibud_dis = еisr_bud– !bud
2 ,               (21) 
maxibud_dis = еisr_bud+ !bud
2 ,                               (22) 
minicom_dis = еisr_com– !com
2 ,                            (23) 
maxicom_dis = еisr_com+ !com
2 .                            (24) 
 
After completing all calculations, the missing values are filled out. In case 
a student entered a university due to the results of the Olympiad competition, 
the USE scores are set randomly in the range [minibud-10; maxibud+10]. For those 
tuition-based students who entered a university on a regular basis the USE 
scores are given randomly in the range (minicom_dis; maxicom_dis). For state-
funded students who entered a university on a regular basis the USE scores are 
given randomly in the range of (minibud_dis; maxibud_dis). 
 
2. Main characteristics of 4 integrated groups of majors 
 
2.1. Universities within the integrated group of Majors “Electronic 
Engineering, Radio Engineering and Communications” 
 
Figure A1 shows the distribution of state-financed and tuition-based 
students in each university within the integrated group of majors “Electronic 
Engineering” (all universities are numbered from 1 to 105). 
Minimum number of state-financed students is 15, maximum is 609. 
Minimum number of tuition-based students is 0, maximum is 85. The majority 
of universities have no more than 200 state-financed students, while the 
number of tuition-based students is quite small. 
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Figure A1. The distribution of state-financed and tuition-based students 
within the integrated group of majors “Electronic Engineering” 
 
Figure A2 shows the range of maximum and minimum Unified State 
Examination (USE) scores of the state-financed students for each university 
within the integrated group of majors “Electronic Engineering”. As it can be 
seen in the following Fig. 2, the range of scores is quite big. 
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Figure A3 shows the average USE scores of state-financed students within 
the integrated group of majors “Electronic Engineering”.  
 
 
 
Figure A3. The average USE scores of the state-financed students within 
the integrated group of majors “Electronic Engineering” 
 
Figure A4 shows the average USE scores of tuition-based students within 
the integrated group of majors “Electronic Engineering”.  
Value “0” means the absence of tuition-based students in the university in 
this area. 
 
 
 
Figure A4. The average USE scores of tuition-based students within the 
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As can be seen on Figures A3 and A4 the distribution of scores of state-
financed and tuition-based students across universities are quite “flat”. 
 
2.2. Universities within the integrated group of Majors  
“Economics and Management” 
 
Figure A5 shows the distribution of state-financed and tuition-based 
students in each university within the integrated group of majors “Economics 
and Management” (all universities are numbered from 1 to 378). 
Minimum number of state-financed students is 0, maximum – 773. 
Minimum number of tuition-based students is 0, maximum – 1335. As can be 
seen from Fig. A5 the number of tuition-based students is very large within the 
studied group of majors. 
 
 
 
Figure A5. The distribution of state-financed and tuition-based students  
in universities within the integrated group of majors  
“Economics and Management” 
 
Figure A6 shows the range of maximum and minimum Unified State 
Examination (USE) scores of the state-financed students for each university. 
The range in scores is observably big. 
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Figure A6. The range of maximum and minimum USE scores  
of state-financed students within the integrated group of majors  
“Economics and Management” 
 
Figure A7 shows the average USE scores of state-financed students. Value 
“0” shows the absence of state-financed students in a university in this area.  
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Figure A8 shows the average USE scores of tuition-based students. Value 
“0” means the absence of tuition-based students in a university in this area. 
 
 
 
Figure A8. The average USE scores of tuition-based students within the 
integrated group of majors “Economics and Management” 
 
Figures A7 and A8 show that the difference between scores of tuition-
based students and state-financed students is quite big. Those universities vary 
markedly in the quality of students they admit.  
 
2.3. Universities within the integrated group of Majors  
“Agriculture and Fishery” 
 
Figure A9 shows the distribution of state-financed and tuition-based 
students in each university within the integrated group of Majors “Agriculture 
and Fishery” (all universities are numbered from 1 to 85). 
The minimum number of state-financed students is 5, maximum – 561. 
Minimum number of tuition-based students is 0, maximum – 212.  
As can be seen many universities do not have tuition-based students, or 
their number is very small. 
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Figure A10 shows the range of maximum and minimum Unified State 
Examination (USE) scores of students for each university within the integrated 
group of Majors “Agriculture and Fishery”. 
The range of scores looks very big, and the minimum score in the majority 
of universities is extremely small. 
 
 
 
Figure A9. The distribution of state-financed and tuition-based students in 
universities within the integrated group of majors “Agriculture and Fishery” 
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Figure A11 shows the average USE scores of state-financed students in 
each university. The scores look quite homogenous.  
 
 
Figure A11. The average USE scores of state-financed students within the 
integrated group of majors “Agriculture and Fishery” 
 
Figure A12 shows the average USE scores of tuition-based students. Value 
“0” means the absence of tuition-based students in the university in this area. 
Universities vary observably in quality of tuition-based students they take.  
 
 
 
Figure A12. The average USE scores of tuition-based students within the 
integrated group of majors “Agriculture and Fishery” 
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2.4. Universities within the integrated group of Majors “Healthcare” 
 
Figure A13 shows the distribution of state-financed and tuition-based 
students in each university within the group of Majors “Healthcare” 
(universities are numbered from 1 to 77). 
The minimum number of state-financed students is 20, maximum – 1043. 
Minimum number of tuition-based students is 0, maximum – 1390. 
 
 
 
Figure A13. The distribution of state-financed and tuition-based students in 
universities within the integrated group of majors “Healthcare” 
 
Figure A14 shows the range of maximum and minimum Unified State 
Examination (USE) scores of the students for each university.  
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Figure A14. The range of maximum and minimum USE scores of state-
financed students within the integrated group of majors “Healthcare” 
 
Figure A15 shows the average USE scores of state-financed students in 
each university.  
 
 
 
Figure A15. The average USE results of state-financed students within the 
integrated group of majors “Healthcare” 
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As can be seen from the Figure above the scores of state-financed students 
in medical specialties are in general higher than 70 and quite homogeneous.  
Figure A16 shows the average USE scores of tuition-based students. Value 
“0” means the absence of tuition-based students in a university in this area.  
 
 
 
Figure A16. The average USE results of tuition-based students in universities 
within the integrated group of majors “Healthcare” 
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